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I
In his discussion of Matthew Arnold in The Use of Poetry
and the Use of Criticism (1933), T. S. Eliot wrote:
Arnold hardly looks ahead to a new stage of experience; and though
he speaks to us of discipline, it is the discipline of culture, not the
discipline of suffering. Arnold represents a period of stasis; of
relative and precarious stability, it is true, a brief halt in the endless
march of humanity in some, or in any direction.!
While this may be unfair in some ways to the author of Empe-
dacles an Etna or Sahrab and Rustum, what Eliot says about
Arnold's precarious stability is true. Arnold's literary criticism
does not look ahead to a new stage of experience. It does mark
time. It cannot cope with change. In one particular direction, it
is fair to say, Arnold brings criticism to an impasse.
The main reason for this is Arnold's attitude towards pleasure
in poetry. He belittles it. To argue that he ignores it is untenable.:!
But he does belittle it; and this attitude remains a constant feature
of his criticism, producing wide-ranging effects, which this essay
seeks to explore.
But first to sketch what is familiar to Arnold students, his
attitude towards pleasure in poetry. In 1853 he wrote to his
friend Clough:
I am glad you like the Gipsy Scholar - but what does it do for
you? Homer animates - Shakespeare animates - in its poor way
I think Sohrab and Rustum animates - the Gipsy Scholar at best
awakens a pleasing melancholy. But this is not what we want.
The complaining millions of men
Darken in labour and pain-
what they want is something to animate and ennoble them - not
merely to add zest to their melancholy or grace to their dreams.
T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (London,
1964), p. 103.
2 F. R. Leavis would disagree here. In his essay "Matthew Arnold" in
The Importance of Scrutiny, ed. E. Bentley (New York, 1948), p. 96,
Leavis argues against T. S. Eliot that Arnold does pay some attention
to "diction", "accent" and "movement". These seem more suitable
headings under which to discuss the grand style than to discuss
whatever style or styles make for "natural magic". Besides, my con-
tention is that if Arnold did attend to certain aspects of naturalistic
poetic pleasure, he did not do so enough.
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- I believe a feeling of this kind is the basis of my nature - and
my poetics.'
Arnold fails to credit his poem's achievement and Clough's
pleasure in it. Wanting poetry to do something, while under-
estimating the importance of the sheer pleasureableness of a
poem, is the very basis of Arnold's poetics.
Arnold's debut as a critic in the same year makes this official.
In what is now called the Preface of 1853, Arnold put together,
for the second edition of his poems, some of the ruminations
that had gone between Clough and himself in their correspondence
from the mid-1840s. This preface is the result of peculiar cir-
cumstances that are now well known and well analysed,4 and
need not be repeated here in detail. Briefly, Arnold suppressed
Empedocles on Etna because he considered it "morbid". Poetry,
he declared, should make for happiness. Quoting Schiller, he
linked the aim of poetry to happiness: art is "dedicated to Joy,
and there is no higher and no more serious problem, than how
to make men happy".5 Nearing the end of his career, Arnold
still insisted in "The Study of Poetry" on poetry's duties to
happiness. The only significant change is that he expanded its
duties to include even more difficult duties, man's "sustenance",
"consolation", the very "self-preservation" of humanity:
We should conceive of [poetry] as capable of higher uses, and called
to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned
to it hitherto. More and more mankind will discover that we have
to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us!
No one seriously or for long disputes that ultimately poetry
increases or at least ought to increase our happiness or sustains
or somehow ought to sustain our humanity. What is disputable
is how poetry does this. Arnold would not agree that mere
pleasurableness alone is one way. Poetry is a complex and
serious affair:
If we conceive thus highly of the destinies of poetry, we must also
set our standard for poetry high, since poetry, to be capable of
3 The Letters oj Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough, ed. H. F.
Lowry (Oxford, 1968), p. 146.
4 See, for example, Sidney Coulling, "Matthew Arnold's 1853 Preface:
Its Origin and Aftermath", Victorian Studies, VII (1964), 233-263;
H. W. Garrod, "Matthew Arnold's 1853 Preface", Review oj English
Studies, XVII (1941), 310-321; and J. D. Jump, "Matthew Arnold and
the Spectator", Review oj English Studies, XXV (1949), 61-64.
5 Complete Prose Works oj Matthew A mold, ed. R. H. Super (Ann
Arbor, 1960), i. 2-3 (hereafter referred to as CPW).
6 CPW, ix. 161.
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fulfilling such high destinies, must be poetry of a high order of
excellence.7
For Arnold that meant poetry of a "high seriousness", poetry of
a profound "criticism of life", or "moral profundity",8 to use
the phrases which he has made famous, and which are still the
best description of what Arnold thought poetry ought to be and
what the greatest poetry is. But they do not explicitly include
pleasure, that is, naturalistic pleasure, not even if one were to
take such pleasure to include what Arnold does say is one valid
function of poetry, "natural magic", the definition of which is
given below. 1£ natural magic, the only form of naturalistic
pleasure that Arnold ever considers at length, is one valid
function of poetry, it is nevertheless superseded by poetry of
high seriousness. Natural magic is an inferior poetic achieve-
ment. What documents this attitude most economically is his
treatment of Maurice de Guerin in 1863 and his last judgment
of Keats in 1880.
After rendering high praise to Guerin for his achievement
in natural magic, Arnold qualifies his praise:
One aspect of poetry fascinated Guerin's imagination and held it
prisoner. Poetry is the interpretress of the natural world, and she
is the interpretress of the moral world; it was as the interpretress
of the natural world that she had Guerin for her mouthpiece. To
make magically near and real the life of Nature, and man's life
only so far as it is a part of that Nature, was his faculty; a faculty
of naturalistic, not of moral interpretation.
He is, Arnold adds, "hardly a moral agent".9 In his final judg-
ment on Keats, Arnold gives high praise to Keats too, and then
similarly qualifies it. In placing Keats once and for all in the
history of English poetry, Arnold grants him a place below
that of true greatness. Keats will be remembered "as no merely
sensuous poet could be" .10 But he is to be remembered, in
spite of his "fascinating felicity", as failing of absolute greatness:
For the second great half of poetic interpretation, for that faculty
of moral interpretation which is in Shakespeare, and is informed
by him with the same power of beauty as his naturalistic interpre-
tation, Keats was not ripe."
7 CPW, ix. 162.
8 CPW, ix. 177 et passim; ix. 46 et passim; iii. 33 et passim.
9 CPW, iii. 30-31.
10 CPW, ix. 213.
11 CPW, ix. 215.
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II
There are assumptions about the nature of pleasure in these
two essays and elsewhere that do not come to the surface clearly,
and Arnold's confidence that natural magic is finally an inadequate
or partial poetic achievement might appear a prejudice or a
superstition as gigantic as Carlyle's about pleasure. But Arnold's
criticism of pleasure is philosophical; and his utter confidence
in this criticism stems from what he considered to be the
particular relation of pleasure to time. Long before publicly
considering Guerin or Keats, as long ago as "The New Sirens"
in the early to mid-forties, Arnold had formed his views on the
inadequacy of pleasure when tested by time. "The New Sirens"
is the young poet's warning that the pursuit of pleasure leads
in time to a life pattern of alternations between satisfaction and
malaise, satiety and emptiness, which ends in despair. That is,
tested by time, pleasure is not a viable means to happiness:
When the lamps are paled at morning,
Heart quits heart and hand quits hand.
Cold in that unlovely dawning,
Loveless, rayless, joyless you shall stand!"
In a lecture at Oxford in 1857, Arnold made the following
comment on De Rerum Natura:
One of the most powerful, the most solemn passages of the work of
Lucretius, one of the most powerful, the most solemn passages in
the literature of the whole world, is the well-known conclusion of
the third book. With masterly touches he exhibits the lassitude, the
incurable tedium which pursue men in their amusements; with
indignant irony he upbraids them for the cowardice with which they
cling to a life which for most is miserable; to a life which contains,
for the most fortunate, nothing but the old dull round of the same
unsatisfying objects for ever presented.13
"Eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow you die" works only if
tomorrow you do die. Arnold - Lionel Trilling would say here,
Dr Arnold's son - saw early that one lived, and that one did
not want to live just to continue the slavish alternations between
fulfilment and despair. Is that not why his Empedocles kills
12 The Poems of Matthew Arnold, ed. K. Allott (London, 1965), p. 43
(hereafter referred to as Poems). Incidentally the Greek motto for
Arnold's volume Empedocles on Etlla and Other Poems (1852), attri-
buted by Allott (pp. 616-7) to Thales, is translated as "Time is the
wisest of things, for it finds out everything" (Hohn).
13 CPW, i. 32.
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himself? To end the vacillation?14
Autotelic, short-lived pleasure does not necessarily lead to
happiness. As Arnold observed in an 1864 Oxford lecture,
The sentiment of the 'religion of pleasure', has much that is natural
in it: humanity will gladly accept it if it can live by it; to live by it
one must never be sick or sorry, and the old, ideal, limited, pagan
world never . . . was sick or sorry, never at least shows itself to
us sick or sorry . . . But in the new, real, immense, post-pagan
world, - in the barbarian world, - the shock of accident is uncea-
sing, the serenity of existence is perpetually troubled. . . . How
does the sentiment of the 'religion of pleasure' serve then? does it
help, does it console? Can a man live by it?"
A man cannot live by it, Arnold makes clear in Literature and
Dogma, a work that shows somewhat more systematically than
elsewhere the moral foundation of his criticism. Arnold once
favoured a mournful but apt line of Sainte-Beuve's by putting it
into his notebook, "L'essential en ce monde est de vivre, de
durer",16 and enduring, living on through time is the whole end
of Arnold's moral considerations about life - and about poetry.
Here is what he says in Literature and Dogma, and this one
can take as Arnold's definitive answer to the question of whether
the "religion of pleasure" is enough:
So entirely does the idea of humanity, of intelligence, of looking
before and after, of raising oneself out of the flux of things, rest
upon the idea of steadying oneself, . . . making order in the chaos
of one's impressions, by attending to one impression rather than the
other. The rules of conduct, of morality, were themselves, philo-
sophers supposed, reached in this way; - the notion of a whole
self as opposed to a partial self, a best self to an inferior self, to a
momentary self a permanent self requiring the restraint of impulses
a man would naturally have indulged; - because, by attending to his
14 Kenneth Allott (Poems, p. 191) would disagree. But it seems that
Arnold sends Empedocles to his death at a moment of hope simply
because he knows he will live beyond that moment to endure despair
again. At the very moment that he says "The numbing cloud/Mounts
off my soul I feel it, I breathe free" (11. 407-8), he doubts it can last:
"Is it but for a moment?" (1. 409). His final words are:
Ere it flag, ere the mists
Of despondency and gloom
Rush over it again,
Receive me, save me! (11. 413-416)
15 CPW, iii. 227-8.
16 The Note-books of Matthew Arnold, ed. H. F. Lowry, K. Young,
W. H. Dunn (London, 1962), p. 532 (from a letter of Sainte-Beuve
of 28 August 1866).
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life, man found it had a scope beyond the wants of the present
momenL'7
There is very little difference between what Arnold thought a
man must do with certain impulses - if he was to survive the
present moment happily, avoiding both satiety and despair-
and what a poem must do to help man do just that. If a man
must restrain some impulses and attend to one impression and
not another, so too must poetry. And if poetry is to attend to
our lives, poetry must make, not for mere pleasure, but for
happiness, and all its various ingredients, serenity and hope
and joy, which Arnold celebrated in certain of his poems.
The way in which Arnold's critique of pleasure directs his
critical judgment is obvious. The essay on Wordsworth, whom
he praises for his profound application of ideas to life, is a
typical and familiar example. But "The Study of Poetry" is
closer to the purpose. It exhibits his judgment on a wide range
of poetry as well as his famous touchstone method of judging,
and both are affected by Arnold's attitude to pleasure.18
The aim of the essay is to expound a critical method for the
study of poetry, a method of judging poetry that will take
account of poetry's "high destinies", its duty to happiness, to
life, to the self-preservation of humanity. The method that
does this is Arnold's "strict judgment", the famous comparative
method of the touchstones that exposes relative failure after
relative failure from Chaucer on. This method produces the
"real estimate", Arnold claims. The personal and the historical
estimates are actually "fallacies" - Arnold's own word.19 To
find the classic, the work of optimum and fixed greatness, is
why we study poetry. He continues:
Everything depends on the reality of a poet's classic character. If
he is a dubious classic, let us sift him; if he is a false classic, let us
explode him. But if he is a real classic . . ., then the great thing
for us is to feel and enjoy his work as deeply as ever we can, and
to appreciate the wide difference between it and all work which has
not the same high character.
For Arnold, if a glass is half full, it is half empty. He concludes:
This is what is salutary, this is what is formative; this is the great
17 CPW, vi. 179.
18 An interesting discussion of the background and influences on Arnold's
writing "The Study of Poetry" is given in John P. Farrell, "Homeward
Bound: Arnold's Late Criticism", Victorian Studies, XVIII (1973),
194-196, 202.
19 CPW, ix. 164.
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benefit to be got from the study of poetry. Everything which inter-
feres with it, which hinders it, is injurious.20
"The Study of Poetry" presents us with negative criticism,
to use Arnold's own words: "But the use of this negative criticism
is not in itself, it is entirely in its enabling us to have a clearer
sense and a deeper enjoyment of what is truly excellent".21 The
essay does help towards a clearer sense and a deeper enjoyment
of what is truly excellent, but for all other purposes, it remains
"negative criticism". In fact, it is a demoralizing document. Its
ultimate implication is that the relative failures which are, after
all, relative successes, need not have been written. They are
superfluous. The touchstones of fixed optimum value make them
superfluous.
Perhaps this could be amended simply by Arnold's taking
a more charitable attitude towards relative failures, and instead
of directing the study of poetry to sift and explode them he
could merely ask that they be gently given their due place.
But what cannot be amended easily and what is far more serious
is the incomplete critical theory implied in the essay, and indeed
in the whole body of Arnold's criticism. Arnold leaves an
important situation in the history of taste unaccounted for. High
seriousness and touchstones aside, Arnold himself succumbed
in his youth to a host of these relative failures - Senancour,
Maurice de Guerin, George Sand, Byron and Keats. He remained
through middle-age deeply attracted to writers strong in "natural
magic", the very natural magic that is an incomplete, an inferior
poetic achievement. Arnold never ceased to place Keats's achieve-
ment below the touchstones, but he never ceased to find enchanting
his "fascinating felicity".
Arnold's attitude to George Sand is of most interest here,
partly because his liking for George Sand is, in his own eyes,
more vulnerable than his liking for Keats. After her death in
1876, Arnold looked back in an essay for Morley's Fortnightly
Review on her meaning to him over the years. Before I cite a
passage from this personal and appealing article, I would like
to quote from a letter to his wife of 5 May 1877, Arnold being
fresh from having re-read George Sand's complete works the
summer before for the Fortnightly article: "G. Sand is beginning
to weigh upon me greatly, though she also interests me very
much; the old feeling of liking for her and of refreshment from
20 CPW, ix. 165.
21 Ibid.
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her, in spite of her faults, comes back".22 It is then with utter
sincerity and not because of the decorum of a memorial occasion,
that Arnold says in this article:
Those who, amid the agitations, more or less stormy, of their youth,
betook themselves to the early works of George Sand, may in later
life cease to read them, indeed, but they can no more forget them
than they can forget Werther.
What is unforgettable, Arnold confesses, is her natural magic.
How the sentences from George Sand's works of that period still
linger in our memory and haunt the ear, with the cadences! Grandiose
and moving, they come, those cadences, like the sighing of the wind
through the forest, like the breaking of the waves on the sea-shore."
"Who can forget the lanes and meadows of Valentine?"24 he
asks and even in middle-age, clearly Arnold cannot. His attra-
ction to George Sand was in spite of her faults, in spite of her
lack of light and hope,25 and was largely because of her natural
magic.
George Sand is just one example of how contemporary litera-
ture had been an attraction for Arnold, a deep and even a
formative one. Why not so for others as well? The attractions
a younger generation was feeling in the 1870s and 1880s Arnold
dismisses. Zola is bad; Hugo half charlatan; Gautier a mere inn
on the road of life;26 Flaubert a novelist of petrified feeling;27 and
eagerly read as Arnold admits the realists are, Balzac and "his
school" are, nonetheless, bounded by their "mingled motive of
curiosity, cupidity, lubricity".28 Swinburne is dismissed as a
pseudo-Shelley. Rather patronizingly Arnold once said that he
"should like to do him some good", but that he feared "he has
taken some bent". Arnold felt things amiss when Swinburne
could be "the favourite poet of the young men at Oxford".29
The list could be longer. It is enough to show that Arnold
repeatedly deprecated those modern or contemporary writers whom
22 The Letters of Matthew Arnold 1848-1888, ed. G. W. E. Russell,
Scholarly Press reprint of 1895 Macmillan edition (Grosse Pointe,
1968), ii. 158 (hereafter referred to as Letters).
23 CPW, viii. 220-1.
24 CPW, viii. 224.
25 CPW, viii. 222.
26 CPW, viii. 231; 230; ix. 47.
27 The Works of Matthew Arnold, AMS reprint of the Macmillan Library
edition, 1903-4 (New York, 1970), iv. 202-3 (hereafter referred to as
W).
28 W, iv. 248.
29 Letters, i. 227-8, 436; ii. 50-51.
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others found profoundly attractive; and that he did so without
exploring why these writers are rightly or wrongly so attractive.
Arnold was once one of those young men at Oxford. His
Swinburne was Senancour or Guerin or George Sand. Arnold's
criticism fails to account for the fact that the young men at
Oxford were and still are attracted - and powerfully so - to
contemporary literature of less than touchstone greatness. To
put it another way, Arnold's criticism fails to acknowledge that
the naturalistic value, the mere pleasurableness of the touchstone
recedes. This is why young men do not generally turn to Homer,
Dante, Shakespeare or Milton for their immediate poetic pleasures.
It is not enough for criticism that is also cultural criticism, as
Arnold's was, to say that they ought to do so. A sample from
his essay on Wordsworth clearly shows that not only did Arnold
not explain this attraction to contemporaries, contemporaries he
deemed low, but that, after barely acknowledging the attraction,
he thought it ought to be "cured":
We find attraction, at times, even in a poetry of revolt against
[morals]; in a poetry which might take for its motto Omar Kheyam's
words: 'Let us make up in the tavern for the time which we have
wasted in the mosque.' Or we find attractions in a poetry indifferent
to them; in a poetry where the contents may be what they will,
but where the form is studied and exquisite. We delude ourselves
in either case; and the best cure for our delusion is to let our minds
rest upon that great and inexhaustible word life, until we learn to
enter into its meaning.30
Arnold's criticism did not attempt to explain or understand such
a "delusion"; it sought solely to "cure" it. Hence "The Study
of Poetry" and the touchstones.
It may appear at this point that I have not taken into con-
sideration Arnold's letter to the Pall Mall Gazette of 1884. Here
he continues to praise George Sand, but on grounds far different
from natural magic. It is on grounds of her lofty motives.
Dropping the former personal appraisal, Arnold returns here to
his usual method of ranking, and he actually ranks George Sand
somewhere near Goethe and Wordsworth:
In the literature of our century, if the work of Goethe is the greatest
and wisest influence, if the work of Wordsworth is the purest and
most poetic, the most varied and attractive influence is, perhaps, the
work of George Sand. Bien dire, c'est bien sentir, and her ample
and noble style rests upon large and lofty qualities.31
30 CPW, ix. 46.
31 W, iv. 249.
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But the difference in appreciation between these two views of
George Sand, the more personal one of 1877, is but an additional
argument against the notion of fixed values in art. That is to
say, Arnold found different value in George Sand's work at
different times. Whether he was offering a "personal estimate"
in 1877 or a "real estimate" (as I think he was trying to do in
considering her future) in 1884, is not the issue. The issue is
that Arnold had two estimates. George Sand clearly meant
different things at different times and profoundly attractive things;
and if she finally meant to Arnold a writer of lofty motive, she
originally and for a long time meant a writer of delightful,
unforgettable, natural magic. All this without being a touchstone.
Had Arnold taken up the implications of his own change in
taste for George Sand, his criticism would have had to admit
that taste does indeed change, that works of art are not of fixed
value, let alone of fixed optimum value; and had Arnold taken
up the implications of his own early taste for George Sand, his
criticism would have had to admit that the mere pleasure value
of the touchstones does indeed recede and that contemporary
or modern work is attractive because it offers just that, a great
deal of mere pleasure, whatever else it may offer. In other
words, Arnold's criticism would have had to develop a principle
of change or modernity in art and abandon the notion of a
tradition of fixed optimum value.
I am not arguing that Arnold should not have ranked works
of poetry, that he should not have considered some works
great or greater than other works. Ultimately Arnold is right
that Paradise Lost is a "greater" work than Gautier's Emaux
et Camees. I am arguing that the value of Paradise Lost, how-
ever superior to that of other works, is not fixed. It is constantly
altering. At no point since its own century has its value or its
aggregate of values, intellectual, poetic and moral, been the
same. The sheer pleasure of the work has receded it would
seem, in favour of the intellectual. But had Arnold developed
a principle of modernity or change, he would have acknowledged
this, and along with it the necessity of the constant modernization
of art.
It would be an exaggeration to say that in failing to do
this, Arnold's criticism laid a dead hand on contemporary poetry.
That surely went its own way regardless. But it is not an
exaggeration to say that Arnold brought criticism, in this parti-
cular direction, to an impasse. He asked so much of moral
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profundity and so much of a tradition he considered absolutely
great, and he asked so little of anything else, that only religion
could satisfy Arnold's demands, and to religion he eventually
turned.
The way out of the impasse and into our own century was
found by Walter Pater; and how he did so underscores the
incompleteness of Arnold's critical achievement. Proceeding
from an opposite appreciation of pleasure, proceeding from a
modified Coleridgean notion that the immediate and prime end
of poetry is a "pleasurable sensation", Pater had no trouble
recognizing that art is always improvising, that art is always
changing just in order to keep the senses awake; and he had no
trouble admitting that a classic could be dull. Copying a classic
would be duller still; and Arnold's effort in Merope would be
indefensible in Pater's criticism, while it seems in some ways a
consequence of Arnold's.
Pater's notions about poetry and art are too familiar to
rehearse again merely to oppose to Arnold's views. But what
is not so familiar is the chapter "Modernity" in the little read
Gaston de Latour. This essay has the advantage of Pater's actu-
ally taking up and scolding some of Arnold's ideas. He does
so in order to make out a case for contemporary poetry and for
the principle of modernity in art. He begins by suggesting that
the classic may well seem dull:
How faint and dim, after all, the sorrows of Dido, of Juliet, the
travail of Aeneas, beside quite recent things felt or done . . . At
best, poetry of the past could move one with no more directness
than the beautiful faces of antiquity which are not here for us to
see and unaffectedly love them.32
Pater chides the notion of the superiority of another age to
the contemporary: "Elderly people, Virgil in hand, might assert
professionally that the contemporary age, an age, of course of
little people and things, deteriorate since the days of their own
youth, must necessarily be unfit for poetic uses". Each age
needs and makes its own poetry and rightly so: "The age renews
32 Gaston de Latour (London, 1910), p. 52. Compare Arnold's remarks
in the 1853 Preface: "Achilles, Prometheus, Clytemnestra, Dido,-
what modern poem presents personages as interesting, even to us
moderns, as these personages of an 'exhausted past'? . . . I fearlessly
assert that Hermann and Dorothea, Chi/de Harold, Jocelyn, The
Excursion, leave the reader cold in comparison with the effect pro-
duced upon him by the latter books of the Iliad, by the Oresteia,
or by the episode of Dido" (CPW, i. 4).
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itself; and in immediate derivation from it a novel poetry also
grows superb and large to fill a certain mental situation made
ready in advance".33
What Pater says about the nature of the classic and the
modern can hardly be gainsaid. Whatever else he did - and I
would not argue that his criticism is wholly "salutary", to use
an Arnoldian word - he did free criticism from Arnold's notion
of fixed optimum value; he did acknowledge and accept the
constantly changing values in art. This is why Pater's and not
Arnold's criticism is the gateway to Yeats and to modernist
aesthetics, which has striven and still strives to bring value out
of a world Arnold would despair of.
David De Laura suggests that both Arnold and Pater were
modern men, both searching for answers in a period of changing
values.34 Certainly they were both searching. But Arnold found
stability of value at the end of his search; he actually found
fixities, while Pater did not. It is this very stability in Arnold
that is more precarious, to use Eliot's word again, in what he
hands down to us. Douglas Bush ends his study of Arnold in
this way:
Nowadays, if we have been benumbed and befogged as well as
stimulated by minute analyses of imagery and myth and symbol,
and overworn by abstract jargon, and if we are sick of sick art and
of the tawdriness of the literary marketplace, it is refreshing to
come back to Arnold, as to the great critics, and encounter central
questions about literature and life as they are seen and felt by the
mature and civilized mind."
It is refreshing to come back to Arnold today, as most teachers
of English must agree, to come back to what Professor Bush
calls a humanist's faith in good letters as the teacher of wisdom
and virtue, in great literature, above all, great poetry, as a
supremely illuminating, animating, fortifying aid in the difficult
endeavour to become or remain fully human.3u Bush's finale
makes us all regret our century. But that does not change the
fact that the security of a humanist's faith is a precarious one.
Returning to Arnold must not blind us to the fact that that
faith today is in question.
33 Gaston, pp. 52-53.
34 See the final pages of De Laura's study of Newman, Arnold and
Pater in Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England (Austin, 1969).
35 Matthew Arnold: A Survey of His Poetry and Prose (London, 1971),
p.133.
36 Ibid., p. 132.
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